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Latent Adversarial Defence with Boundary-guided
Generation
Xiaowei Zhou, Ivor W. Tsang, and Jie Yin, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have recently
achieved great success in many tasks, which encourages DNNs to
be widely used as a machine learning service in model sharing
scenarios. However, attackers can easily generate adversarial
examples with a small perturbation to fool the DNN models
to predict wrong labels. To improve the robustness of shared
DNN models against adversarial attacks, we propose a novel
method called Latent Adversarial Defence (LAD). The proposed
LAD method improves the robustness of a DNN model through
adversarial training on generated adversarial examples. Different
from popular attack methods which are carried in the input
space and only generate adversarial examples of repeating
patterns, LAD generates myriad of adversarial examples through
adding perturbations to latent features along the normal of the
decision boundary which is constructed by an SVM with an
attention mechanism. Once adversarial examples are generated,
we adversarially train the model through augmenting the training
data with generated adversarial examples. Extensive experiments
on the MNIST, SVHN, and CelebA dataset demonstrate the
effectiveness of our model in defending against different types
of adversarial attacks.
Index Terms—Model sharing, Adversarial training, Defence,
Deep learning
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, deep neural network models have beensuccessfully applied in many areas, such as image pro-
cessing [1], [2], speech [3], [4] and natural language process-
ing [5], [6], etc. Training a DNN model often requires large
amounts of labeled data and significant efforts of parameter
tuning. As such, it accelerates the development of DNN
models to be hosted in a cloud and run as a service that can
be shared by a third party. This leads to many online machine
learning as service platforms (MLaaS) that provide Web-based
API services for various tasks based on DNN models. For
example, image and video analysis from the AWS pre-trained
AI Services [7], powerful image analysis from Google Cloud
Vision [8].
In such model sharing scenarios, the increasing use of DNN
models, however, has raised serious security and reliability
concerns. This can be illustrated in Fig. 1. The service
providers train DNN models using the dataset they collect,
which are expected to achieve high classification accuracy on
test examples having similar distributions with the training
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Fig. 1. Attacks in model sharing scenario. Service provider trains a high-
performanced DNN classifier and shares it to public. The end user performs
classification task through the shared model without knowledge about the
generated adversarial examples which are generated by attackers to attack the
shared model interface.
dataset. The trained DNN models can be hosted in the cloud
and run as a service. End users may then provide their own
test examples, mostly unknown to the service provider in
advance, into the shared model to obtain prediction results.
However, very often, test examples are very likely to be
mixed with unknown adversarial examples [9], [10], which
could be unnoticeable to end users. Adversarial examples
can be generated by attackers through adding small crafted
perturbations to legitimate examples. These examples are often
indistinguishable to human eyes, so they can easily fool DNN
models to predict wrong labels. What makes it even worse is
that these adversarial examples can be generated by various
types of unknown attack methods, leading a dramatic drop
in classification accuracy. This is attributed to the fact that
the shared DNN models are not robustly trained to defend
various unknown adversarial attacks before they are released
as a service. Thus, in this paper, we are mainly concerned
about how to enhance the adversarial robustness of shared
DNN models from service provider perspectives.
To enhance the robustness of DNN models against various
adversarial attacks, adversarial training methods have been
shown to be most effective [11], [12], [13]. The key idea is to
augment the training set with generated adversarial examples
to train the DNN model before it is released as service.
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Fig. 2. Overview of Latent Adversarial Defence. (a) Train a generator through feature extractor, i.e., DNN classifier, to decode latent features to images. (b)
Generate adversarial examples by perturbing latent features alongside the decision boundary norm of attention SVM. zi is the latent feature; β is attention
weights; d is the boundary norm; yi is the label of the example. (c) Adversarially train the DNN classifier to improve adversarial robustness. The blue dots
with red circle are adversarial examples.
Different methods have been proposed to generate adversarial
examples through adding a small perturbation to a legitimate
input sample [11], [14], [15], [16]. Formally, for a given
classifier f , the predicted label of an input sample x is defined
as f(x), and f(x′) is the label of adversarial example x′:
x′ = x+ δ, s.t. f(x′) 6= f(x), (1)
where δ is the small perturbation added to an input sample x.
x′ is the generated adversarial example in the neighborhood of
the original legitimate sample in the input space. The original
input examples can be augmented with adversarial examples
generated this way to adversarially train the DNN model.
However, most of the existing methods suffer from two
major limitations. First, because the perturbation is added with
respect to individual input examples, these methods often only
craft adversarial examples of repeating patterns. The DNN
models adversarially trained with these examples would be
only effective to defend very specific types of adversarial
attacks, but still vulnerable to other unknown adversarial at-
tacks. Therefore, this presses the need to increase the diversity
of generated adversarial examples so that the DNN model
can fully explore the unknown adversarial example space to
improve the robustness.
Second, most of the methods are carried out in the input
space, where legitimate examples are often corrupted with
noise and have complex distributions. As such, operating in
the input space may mislead the generation of adversarial
examples, which would severely hurt the DNN model. Only
recently, Song et al. [17] proposed a deep learning based
attack method, GA, to generate adversarial images in the
latent space. They explored the AC-GAN [18] latent space to
generate adversarial images that would most likely mislead the
targeted classifier. However, the GA method treats all examples
equally, but neglects the decision boundary information while
generating adversarial examples. This inevitably reduces the
effectiveness of adversarial training. In essence, the decision
boundary plays a critical role in guiding the generation of
adversarial examples. Intuitively, adversarial examples close to
the decision boundary would best contribute to enhancing the
DNN model, while those far away from the decision boundary
would be much less useful. However, how to use the decision
boundary to guide the generation of adversarial examples is
less explored.
To tackle aforementioned limitations, in this paper, we
propose a novel method called Latent Adversarial Defence
(LAD), which is designed to generate myriad of adversarial
examples based on the decision boundary in a latent space
and to robustly defend against different unknown adversarial
attacks. Fig. 2 gives an overview of the proposed LAD model.
Unlike the existing methods that operate in the input space,
LAD generates adversarial examples by adding perturbations
to latent features, which can be used to construct the decision
boundary more accurately. Our adversarial examples genera-
tion is guided by the normal of decision boundary in latent
space, which is learned through a support vector machine
(SVM) [19] with an attention mechanism. This provides an
unrestricted way to generate a variety of adversarial examples.
After adversarial training on generated adversarial examples,
the fine-tuned DNN model is effective in defending against
different types of unknown adversarial attacks. Comprehensive
experiments are conducted on the MNIST, SVHN, and CelebA
dataset to verify the effectiveness of the proposed model.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold:
• We propose a new method for generating adversarial
examples by adding boundary guided perturbations in the
latent feature space, which are inherently different from
the forms of the original examples.
• Our generator can exhibit transitions of adversarial exam-
ples in both feature and label space across the decision
boundary, providing valuable insights regarding when and
how potential attacks happen.
• After adversarial training on our generated adversarial
examples, the fine-tuned model improves its adversarial
robustness and better defends different types of attacks.
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II. RELATED WORK
This section reviews two main branches of related lit-
erature: adversarial attack methods and adversarial defence
approaches.
A. Adversarial Attack
From methodology point of view, existing adversarial at-
tack methods can be grouped into two categories: gradient-
based methods and label-based methods. Gradient-based at-
tack methods modify an input sample in the direction of the
gradient of loss function with respect to the input sample.
Goodfellow et al., [11] proposed a gradient based attack
approach, called fast gradient sign method (FGSM), which
uses the sign of gradient (∇xJ(θ, x, y)) of loss function with
respect to input examples as perturbation. Built upon FGSM,
the one-step attack method, Madry et al., [14] proposed a
multi-step attack method called PGD. PGD iteratively uses
the gradient information and generates adversarial examples
on the results of the last step. Papernot et al., [15] introduced
saliency map based on Jacobian matrix into the generation
of adversarial examples. The saliency values computed by
forward derivative of a target model are used as an indicator to
determine the locations in input examples to add perturbation.
This method is called Jacobian saliency map attack (JSMA).
Label-based methods, on the other hand, manipulate the
labels of training data to make the learned DNN model
beneficial to their specific purposes. This line of methods use
Eq. (1) as a measure, i.e., changing the original label to target
label, to generate adversarial examples. Carlini et al. proposed
an approach, CW [16], to generate adversarial examples by
adding small change on the original images in the input space.
CW tries to minimize the distance between benign examples
and adversarial ones, while enforcing the label of adversarial
examples as the targeted ones. A deep learning based attack
method, GA, was developed by Song et al. [17]. GA exploits
an AC-GAN [18] to generate adversarial images via exploring
the latent space of random noise input z.
We summarize and compare different methods for gener-
ating adversarial examples, as shown in Table I. Most of the
existing attack methods are carried in the input space and can
only craft adversarial examples of repeating patterns. Although
GA [17] attempts to generate adversarial examples in the latent
space, the crucial information on the decision boundary is
not considered. To fill the gap, our LAD method generates
adversarial examples through perturbing latent features, which
can greatly increase the diversity of adversarial examples
through inverting the perturbed latent features to input space.
Guided by the decision boundary, the proposed LAD model is
able to generate a diversity of adversarial examples near the
decision boundary (the most uncertain examples) to improve
robustness of DNN models through adversarial training.
B. Adversarial Defence
For various types of adversarial attacks, a key research
question is, how can one improve the adversarial robustness
of a DNN model before it is deployed as a service? In
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT METHODS FOR GENERATING ADVERSARIAL
EXAMPLES.
Attack methods Gradient-based Label-based Input space Latent space Boundary
FGSM [11] X 7 X 7 7
PGD [14] X 7 X 7 7
JSMA [15] X 7 X 7 7
CW [16] 7 X X 7 7
GA [17] 7 X 7 X 7
LAD (ours) 7 X 7 X X
response, defence strategies have been proposed to mitigate
the effect of adversarial attacks. Adversarial defence methods
can be generally divided into three categories: 1) Defensive
distillation [20], [21], which aims at learning a smooth targeted
defence model with d training times. The ground truth labels
are used as supervised information for the first trained model.
Except for the first time, the predicted labels from (d− 1)-th
model are used as ground truth to train the d-th model. Finally,
the d-th model F d is the distilled model, which is more robust
against adversarial attacks. 2) adversarial example de-noising,
which tries to remove the perturbation added on adversarial
examples to obtain a similar sample to the original one. The
de-nosing examples can be easily processed by the model,
compared with adversarial examples. Defence-GAN [22] and
MagNet [23] are two typical methods falling into this category.
3) Adversarial training [11], [12], [13] is an effective defence
method, which defends attacks by augmenting the training
data with adversarial examples when training the targeted
model. Adversarial training can be carried either by training
the targeted model with the original and adversarial examples
[24] or with a modified loss function [11].
Among these methods, defensive distillation and adversarial
example de-noising methods may incur high computational
overhead, because it is computationally expensive to addition-
ally train the shared models several times or de-noise the
adversarial examples by a GAN before classification. This
makes them unsuitable to be deployed for model sharing
scenarios. Our proposed LAD model falls into adversarial
training based defence methods. Unlike the existing methods
that are only effective to specific attacks, LAD generates
a variety of adversarial examples guided by the decision
boundary in the latent space. Therefore, it is effective to
robustly defend different types of unknown adversarial attacks.
III. LATENT ADVERSARIAL DEFENCE
To enhance adversarial robustness of DNN models, Latent
adversarial defence (LAD) model aims to generate diverse
adversarial examples based on a decision boundary constructed
in a latent space. From the perspective of the latent space,
perturbations are added to latent features, which is guided by
the normal of decision boundary. To observe the corresponding
changes in the input space, we train a generator to map the
latent features back to the input space. When the strength of
perturbation increases, the corresponding adversarial examples
in the input space towards the target label can be generated by
the trained generator. Through adversarial training, generated
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adversarial examples are used to improve the adversarial
robustness of DNN models.
In the following, we present the details of our proposed
LAD model.
A. Training of Boundary-guided Generator
As mentioned above, the generator is trained to invert latent
features to the input space, so that humans can understand
what changes happen in the input space, caused by changes
of latent features.
For a specific DNN model such as LeNet-5, we learn a
generator Gˆ which is trained on a dataset Xtr = {x1, ..., xn}
to map latent features to the input space. As shown in Fig. 2
(a), each sample in the training dataset is fed into the feature
extractor, i.e., the DNN model to extract the corresponding
latent features. The output of any fully connected layer of a
DNN model can be used to construct the latent space Ztr =
{z1, ..., zn}. Sample xi and its corresponding latent features
zi are fed in the designed generator. The objective function of
G over the neural network class G is as follows:
Gˆ = argmin
G∈G
n−1
n∑
i=1
‖xi −G(zi)‖pp , (2)
where ‖ · ‖p represents lp norm, p = 1 or p = 2 in this paper;
zi = φ(xi), where φ is a feature extractor, part of a DNN
model.
A mapping between the latent space and the input space is
learned by optimizing Eq. (2). Thus, reconstructed data point
xˆi can be obtained by passing zi to the trained generator Gˆ.
B. Latent Boundary-guided Generation
We generate adversarial examples in the latent space, which
is guided by the decision boundary obtained from learn-
ing a support vector machine (SVM) on latent features. As
perturbation strength  increases, the predicted label of a
generated sample would change from the correct one to the
false one, while humans may think the label of the generated
sample remains unchanged. For example, in Fig. 2 (b), a small
perturbation 1 is added to latent features zi, labels of the first
two generated examples are both 3 for human eyes, but the
targeted DNN model predicts the two images (yi and y1i ) as
3 and 5, respectively.
a) Boundary-guided Attention: Firstly, in order to obtain
the decision boundary between two classes, a linear SVM with
attention mechanism is trained on latent features extracted
from the test dataset. Because the training dataset is usually
inaccessible in model sharing scenarios, we use a small num-
ber of test examples, usually 20∼200 examples, to construct a
test latent space Ztest through the targeted DNN model. After
constructing the test latent space with the corresponding labels,
a linear SVM with attention is trained. Therefore, a decision
boundary and its normal are defined at the same time.
Note that, attention mechanism [25] is used when we
train the linear SVM, which is beneficial to capture a better
representation with different weights assigned to different parts
of latent features. Specifically, an attention layer is added to
process latent features, rather than directly taking them as
input to SVM. The attention layer is defined as follows:
αi=tanh (conv(zi)), β
j
i =
exp(αji )∑N
j=1exp(α
j
i )
, and zatti =βizi,
where zi is a latent feature; conv represents convolutional
operation; tanh is the activation function; βi is the attention;
zatti is the output after applying attention operation on the
latent feature zi.
b) Latent Feature Perturbation: Secondly, latent features
for each sample are modified according to the normal of the
decision boundary obtained in the previous step. The normal
d provides a direction guiding our generation and the attention
β captures the importance of different parts of latent features
to moving across the boundary. Different perturbations () are
added to the same latent features zi to obtain the modified
latent features z1i and z
2
i by:
z1i = zi + 
1βid and z2i = zi + 
2βid,
where d is the normal of decision boundary from the linear
SVM; βi is the attention obtained by SVM for each sample;
1 and 2 represent different strength of perturbation. To see
more clearly, Fig. 2 (b) illustrates the change of relationship
between modified latent features and the DNN model. For z2i ,
the predicted label of the generated example has changed, but
the real label is still the same as the original example.
If z1i and z
2
i are further fed into the remaining part of
the DNN model, we could obtain the labels of the modified
latent features. Here, the remaining part of the DNN model
refers to the remaining layers after the layer from which latent
features are extracted. We denote this remaining part as fp.
For example, if we extract features of the second-to-last fully
connected layer of LeNet, the remaining part of the DNN
model is the last fully connected layer and softmax classifier.
When the value of perturbation is big enough, the label
of the modified latent features would change from positive
(negative) to negative (positive), which means that it would
cross the decision boundary of the DNN model. As shown in
Fig. 2 (b), modified latent features z1i move from the left side
of the classifier to the right side. As the strength of perturbation
continues to increase, modified latent features z2i would move
far away from the decision boundary.
c) Boundary-guided Generation: Thirdly, modified latent
features are inverted to examples in the input space, so
that humans can understand the changes caused by different
strength of perturbation added. As we can see from Fig. 2
(b), different latent features including the original one zi are
fed into the trained generator Gˆ to obtain the corresponding
reconstructed image xˆi: xˆi = Gˆ (zi + βd), where  ≥ 0.
Ideally, the classification results of latent features being
directly fed into the remaining DNN model fp and the
corresponding reconstructed image being fed into the DNN
model f should be consistent. That is, the following equation
should be satisfied:
fp
(
zji
)
= f
(
Gˆ(zji )
)
. (3)
However, Eq. (3) does not always hold true for some modified
latent features. For those examples, whose labels of latent
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features and reconstructed images are inconsistent, they are
adversarial examples that are effective to attack the targeted
DNN model. From this perspective, the reason for this kind
of adversarial attack is the inconsistency of latent features and
input images. In other words, the mapping learned by the DNN
model is not robust enough. There are still fundamental blind
spots in the targeted DNN model [11].
C. Adversarial Defence
As we discussed above, one of the reasons for attack
existence may be the existence of fundamental blind spots in
the targeted DNN model. Is there any solution for the DNN
model to avoid being attacked to some extent?
In this paper, we adopt adversarial training to alleviate this
problem. For adversarial training, the adversarial loss function
can be rewritten as follows:
J˜ = αJ (θ;x, y) + (1− α)J
(
θ; Gˆ (z + βd) , y
)
(4)
where J(θ;x, y) is the original loss function for the DNN
classifier; α is the weighted factor to control importance of
two parts, usually set as 0.5; Gˆ(z + βd) is the generated
adversarial example; z = φ(x), the latent features.
Through adversarial training, we fine-tune the targeted DNN
model on the generated adversarial examples. We will later
empirically show that, this fine-tuned DNN model is not
only robust against attacks targeted on the classifier with the
same structure as our feature extractor, but also effective to
defend some other attacks targeted on other unknown and
different classifiers. As shown in Fig. 2 (c), the new model
is able to predict labels of adversarial examples correctly after
adversarial training. The fine-tuned DNN model is more robust
than the original one.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed model, we
conduct extensive experiments on MNIST [26], SVHN [27],
and CelebA [28]. We attempt to generate adversarial examples
to attack the targeted DNN model, i.e., the DNN classifiers,
show the mechanism of attack from the perspective of data
space and defend different types of attacks with adversarially
trained classifiers using our LAD. Specifically, in section IV-A,
we show the performance of our trained generator to make sure
it captures the mapping between latent space and input space.
Generated adversarial examples by other attack methods and
our LAD are compared in section IV-B. Understanding attack
mechanism may help defend various attacks in a uniform
method. Therefore, we try to understand the attack progress
in section IV-C. Section IV-D presents the defence results on
MNIST, SVHN, and CelebA dataset.
Note that, we use DNN models with different architectures
and depths, e.g., LeNet [29] model, shallow and deep VGG
model [30] as the targeted classifiers on the three datasets,
respectively. Apart from these models, we also use some
unknown DNN classifiers whose model details are unknown
to the service provider in model sharing scenarios, as the
targeted classifiers. After adversarial training on generated
adversarial examples, we also verify the effectiveness of the
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 3. Reconstructed images of our generator trained on MNIST. (a) and (c)
depict original training and test images, whereas (b) and (d) show generated
training and test images.
adversarially trained classifiers to defend against different
types of attacks, including weak and powerful attacks, targeted
and untargeted attacks, and attacks targeted on known and
unknown classifiers.
A. Quality of Generated Examples
We first validate the performance of our trained generator
in terms of its ability to capture the mapping between the
latent space and the input space. Specifically, we trained a
generator on the MNIST dataset using latent features, whose
dimension is 500, from the second-to-last layer of LeNet.
In Appendix Table XI, all the components of the generator
architecture except for activation functions are listed. After
the last convolutional layer, a sigmoid activation function is
added and the loss function used is mean square error (MSE):
`(x, xˆ) = 1n
∑n
i=1 (xi − xˆi)2.
We evaluated our generator through quantitative and quali-
tative results. The training loss on training dataset after 1000
epoch and the test loss over test dataset are 0.00757 and
0.00765, respectively. Fig. 3 shows reconstructed images using
our generator trained on MNIST. In detail, Fig. 3(a) and 3(c)
are original training and test images, while 3(b) and 3(d)
are generated training and test images, which are very similar
to the original images. From both quantitative and qualitative
results, we can conclude that, the trained generator is able to
capture the mapping between the latent space and the input
space.
B. Diversity of Adversarial Examples
We compare adversarial examples generated by our LAD
model and other two attack methods (FGSM and JSMA) on
MNIST. For our method, we used the trained generator to
generate adversarial examples against the LeNet model. Latent
features from the second-to-last fully connected layer in LeNet
are used to train an SVM model which yields the boundary
norm for generation. Each extracted latent feature is changed
by adding perturbations with different strength (). Finally,
changed latent features are fed into the trained generator to
generate adversarial examples. For FGSM and JSMA, we
generated adversarial samples through cleverhans [31].
a) Variety of Adversarial Examples: Fig. 4 shows ex-
ample images generated by FGSM, JSMA, and our method.
These images are generated using different perturbations.
Compared with adversarial examples generated by FGSM and
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Fig. 4. Adversarial examples generated by FGSM, JSMA, and our model,
where the topmost number indicates class label.
JSMA, our LAD model is able to generate non-blurry images.
It is worth noting that, our model generates a more diverse
set of distinct examples, whereas the examples generated
from FGSM and JSMA are always noisy images of repeating
patterns. This is because our model generates these examples
by modifying latent features rather than slightly altering the
original images in the input space.
b) Attack Success Rate: Generated adversarial examples
by our model are effective in attacking the pre-trained LeNet
model. As shown in Fig. 5, the attack success rate increases,
as strength of perturbation  increases. In particular, when 
is equal to 20.0, attack success rates are very close to 1. This
means that the generated adversarial examples by our LAD
model are hard to predict correctly for the originally pre-
trained classifier, so that these examples would be beneficial
to improve the model.
Fig. 5. Attack success rates under different perturbations. The white color
indicates a higher attack success rates.
C. Understanding Attacks
Why prediction models are easily attacked by generated
adversarial examples? To answer this question, we analyze the
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Fig. 6. Transition of targeted attacks and polymorphism of attacks. The
number on top of an image is the value of perturbation().
robustness of prediction models against two types of attacks
from the perspective of data space. Understanding the attack
mechanism would be beneficial to find solutions to improve the
adversarial robustness of prediction models. The adversarial
examples in this part are generated through our LAD model.
a) Transition of Targeted Attacks: From classification
perspectives, examples close to the decision boundary are
more likely to be misclassified by a classifier. This also
means, it is relatively easier to form a target attack for
those examples near the decision boundary, because adding
very small perturbations can change their predicted labels. As
shown in Fig. 6 (a), the original sample is apparently a digit
0. When we increase the value of perturbation() added to
the corresponding latent features of the original sample along
the boundary normal, the prediction of generated examples
changes from 0 to 5. The two examples near the decision
boundary, generated with  = 9 and  = 11, are inherently
ambiguous, even making humans difficult to make a decision.
If we add these ambiguous adversarial examples with labels
to the training dataset, it would be helpful to improve the
adversarial robustness of classifiers.
b) Polymorphism of Attacks: In another scenario where
the data space is mixed with similar classes, if we generate
examples in the mixed space, it is difficult for a classifier
to give a correct label. For example, in Fig. 6 (b), the label
of the original sample is 1. From the latent features of the
same original sample, we generated examples with different
perturbations along the boundary normal from class 1 to class
7. We found the labels of generated examples included not
only class 1 and 7, but also class 3. Furthermore, DNN
classifier predicted the two examples, generated with  = 10
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and  = 14, as class 7 and class 3, while humans are more
likely to classify them as class 1 and class 7. For these
similarly adversarial examples, more and more examples with
labels would help classifiers to be robust.
D. Latent Adversarial Defence
As discussed in the last section, generated adversarial ex-
amples, especially the one near decision boundary, would be
beneficial to improve robustness of classifiers. Considering
this, we fine-tuned the pre-trained classifier by augmenting
the training dataset with the generated adversarial examples
to improve model adversarial robustness against different
attacks. Experiments were carried to prove effectiveness of
our proposed model to defend against our own attacks as well
as other types of attacks.
Experimental results on MNIST, SVHN, and CelebA are
presented in this section. We conducted experiments to defend
attacks targeted on known classifier, e.g., LeNet, shallow and
deep VGG, as well as unknown classifiers for our LAD
model. The attacks targeted on unknown classifiers refer to
that the adversarial examples are generated through some
attack methods to attack the classifiers which are unknown
to our LAD model, i.e., the service provider in model sharing
scenarios. If the adversarially trained classifiers through our
LAD method are also able to defend the attacks targeted on
unknown classifiers, it means our LAD method is effective to
improve the adversarial robustness of classifiers even against
unknown attacks. Note that, the adversarial examples from
FGSM, JSMA, CW, and PGD were generated using adversar-
ial examples library cleverhans [31], while the results from
GA were generated by code in [17].
1) Experiments on MNIST: In this part, we show the
experimental results on MNIST. LeNet model is set as the
shared classifier, i.e., the targeted classifier for attack. MNIST
test dataset includes 10,000 legitimate examples, part of which
are used in our defence experiments.
TABLE II
DEFENDING ATTACKS TARGETD ON LENET: CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY
OF ORIGINAL LENET AND Adv. LeNet ON ADVERSARIAL DATASET
TARGETING LENET.
Datasets original LeNet Adv. LeNet
Adv. dataset (FGSM) 1.77% 21.67%
Adv. dataset (JSMA) 8.71% 39.89%
Adv. dataset (PGD) 0.6% 9.44%
Adv. dataset (CW) 98.14% 98.48%
a) Robustness of Adversarially Trained Classifier: To
adversarially train the pre-trained LeNet, we randomly selected
50 images per class from MNIST test dataset to generate
4500 adversarial examples for each strength of perturbations
[0.1, 2.0, 5.0, 7.0, 10.0, 15.0, 20.0], which resulted in a
dataset called Large Adv. datasets. This dataset with different
perturbations was separately used to fine-tune LeNet. We
conducted classification task on clean MNIST test dataset
using these fine-tuned LeNet. The results are given in Fig. 7,
colored in blue(lines with square). It is clear to observe:
1). As  increases, the classification accuracy of the fine-
tuned model decreases. 2). When  = 0.1, the fine-tuned
LeNet outperforms original pre-trained LeNet. The reason for
improved performance is that our proposed model enriches
the data space with more unseen examples through boundary-
guided generation. As such, the fine-tuned model is more
robust. However, when  continues to increase, the classifi-
cation accuracy of adversarially fine-tuned LeNets decreases.
This is because, the larger  is, more ambiguous examples are
generated.
To further verify the effectiveness of defence using our
LAD model, we adversarially trained the LeNet on mixed
adversarial examples, which were generated with perturbations
[0.1, 1.6, 3.2, 5.5, 10.0, 20.0] and are different from Large
Adv. datasets. We refer to this dataset as Small Adv. datasets
and the adversarially trained LeNet as Adv. LeNet. From
Fig. 7, the red part(lines without square), we can see that, our
LAD fine-tuned model yields higher classification accuracy on
adversarial examples than originally trained LeNet.
b) Defending Attacks Targeted on LeNet: We also verify
the effectiveness of our adversarially trained LeNet model on
our generated adversarial examples to defend attacks from
other methods, such as FGSM, JSMA, PGD, and CW, when
they have full access to LeNet. For FGSM and PGD attack
methods, 450 (per class) randomly selected images in MNIST
test dataset were used to generate 4500 adversarial examples,
which was under untargeted attack condition. But for JSMA
and CW, 500 legitimate examples (50 per class) were randomly
sampled to generate 4500 adversarial examples, which was
under targeted condition. Note that, for FGSM and PGD, we
set perturbation as 0.3; for CW, we use l2 norm distance.
Table II compares defence performance of the original and
Adv. LeNet against FGSM, JSMA, PGD, and CW. We can
see that, the adversarially trained LeNet model (Adv. LeNet)
on our generated adversarial examples are also effective to
defend attacks from FGSM and JSMA, with improved classi-
fication accuracy on two adversarial datasets from 1.77% to
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TABLE III
DEFENDING UNKNOWN ATTACKS: CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF
ORIGINAL LENET AND FT-0.1 LENET ON unknown ADVERSARIAL
DATASET.
Datasets original LeNet FT-0.1 LeNet
unknown Adv. data (FGSM) 41.71% 49.60%
unknown Adv. data (JSMA) 93.91% 92.44%
unknown Adv. data (PGD) 29.93% 35.93%
unknown Adv. data (GA) 99.82% 99.72%
unknown Adv. data (CW) 99.12% 99.38%
21.67% and from 8.71% to 39.89%, respectively. For the more
powerful attack methods, our model is also able to improve
the classification accuracy, from 0.6% to 9.44% on PGD Adv.
dataset and from 98.14% to 98.48% on CW Adv. dataset.
c) Defending Unknown Attacks: We also conducted ex-
periments to investigate whether our adversarially trained
LeNet model is useful for defending attacks targeted on
unknown DNN classifier (called black CNN). For our LAD
model, there is no information about the unknown classifier
used to generate adversarial examples by state-of-the-art meth-
ods. Apart from FGSM, JSMA, PGD, and CW, we also used
GA to generate adversarial examples targeted on black CNN
to attack our fine-tuned LeNet model. Likewise, for FGSM
and PGD, we also set perturbation as 0.3; for CW, we still
chose l2 norm distance. For the CW and JSMA unknown ad-
versarial datasets, 500 legitimate examples (50 per class) were
randomly sampled to generate 4500 adversarial examples,
which was under targeted attack condition. For other methods,
4500 legitimate examples (450 per class) were used for 4500
adversarial examples generation, which was under untargeted
attack condition. Results are reported in Table III, where the
FT-0.1 LeNet is our adversarially trained model on adversarial
examples with  = 0.1. On unknown adversarial dataset
generated by FGSM, PGD and CW, FT-0.1 LeNet improves
the accuracy to 49.60%, 35.93% and 99.38%. This manifests
that our adversarially trained LeNet model can robustly defend
against FGSM, PGD and CW attack. On unknown adversarial
dataset (JSMA) and unknown adversarial dataset (GA), the
accuracy of FT-0.1 LeNet slightly drops as compared with
the original LeNet. This is probably because, adding 4500
adversarial examples might also introduce noises, making it
difficult to further improve the classification performance,
given that the original LeNet already achieves the accuracy
of 93.91% and 99.82%, respectively.
d) Defence in Latent Space vs. Input Space: Why do
we use latent features rather than input images to generate
adversarial examples and conduct latent adversarial defence?
Experiments were carried to prove better performance by our
latent adversarial defence. FGSM, JSMA, PGD, and CW are
four baseline methods, which generate adversarial examples
by adding perturbations in input space, while our method and
GA do this in latent space. We generated adversarial examples
and fine-tuned the LeNet model on the individually adversarial
datasets and then evaluated the classification accuracy on clean
MNIST test dataset. From Table IV, we can see that our fine-
tuned LeNet model on adversarial examples with  = 0.1
(FT-0.1) obtains the best classification results. Even though
TABLE IV
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY ON MNIST TEST DATASET USING ORIGINAL
AND FINE-TUNED LENET MODELS ON DIFFERENT ADVERSARIAL
EXAMPLES GENERATED BY DIFFERENT ATTACK METHODS.
Trained models Classification accuracy
Original LeNet 99.13%
Fine-tuned LeNet on FGSM 93.57%
Fine-tuned LeNet on JSMA 95.71%
Fine-tuned LeNet on PGD 90.98%
Fine-tuned LeNet on CW 98.71%
Fine-tuned LeNet on GA 97.23%
Fine-tuned LeNet on our model 99.34%
we fine-tune LeNet on our adversarial examples with other
perturbations , classification accuracy on MNIST test dataset
of our method is also the best (refer to Fig. 7). This means
our LAD model does not hurt the classification performance
with defending attacks.
2) Experiments on SVHN: In this part, we present the
experimental results on SVHN [27] dataset to prove the
effectiveness of the proposed method. A model based on
shallow VGG is set as the shared classifier, which is called
svhnNet (see Appendix Table XII). Features whose dimension
are 4096, from the fifth layer in svhnNet, are extracted for
training generator. The generator (see Appendix Table XIII) is
trained on SVHN training dataset including 73257 examples.
After that, we randomly select some images from each class
in SVHN test dataset to generate adversarial examples. Note
that, the original svhnNet hereinafter refers to svhnNet trained
on clean SVHN training dataset and fine-tuned svhnNet is
adversarially trained on adversarial examples generated by
LAD with different  or by other attack methods.
a) Defending Attacks Targeted on svhnNet: We show ex-
perimental results of our model on defending attacks targeted
on svhnNet in this part. The model, svhnNet, is set as the
targeted classifier. For FGSM and PGD, we set perturbation as
0.3 and used 4500 randomly selected legitimate examples (450
per class) to generate 4500 adversarial examples under untar-
geted attack condition. For JSMA, 500 legitimate examples (50
per class) were randomly sampled to generate 4500 adversarial
examples under targeted attack condition. Table V presents
the classification result on adversarial examples generated by
different attack methods. On adversarial dataset generated
by FGSM, PGD, and JSMA, FT-0.5 svhnNet improves the
accuracy from 17.20%, 30.40%, and 35.78% to 21.60%,
32.56% and 37.40%, respectively. We see from the table,
attacks from FGSM, PGD, and JSMA targeted on svhnNet
are defended against by our fine-tuned svhnNet model.
TABLE V
DEFENDING ATTACKS TARGETED ON SVHNNET: CLASSIFICATION
ACCURACY OF ORIGINAL AND FT-0.5 svhnNet ON ADVERSARIAL DATASET
TARGETING SVHNNET. THE FT-0.5 SVHNNET IS OUR FINE-TUNED MODEL
ON ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES WITH  = 0.5.
Datasets Original svhnNet FT-0.5 svhnNet
Adv. dataset (FGSM) 17.20% 21.60%
Adv. dataset (PGD) 30.40% 32.56%
Adv. dataset (JSMA) 35.78% 37.40%
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TABLE VI
DEFENDING UNKNOWN ATTACKS: CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF
ORIGINAL AND FT-2.0 SVHNNET ON unknown ADVERSARIAL DATASET.
THE FT-2.0 SVHNNET IS OUR FINE-TUNED MODEL ON ADVERSARIAL
EXAMPLES WITH  = 2.0.
Datasets Original svhnNet FT-2.0 svhnNet
unknown Adv. dataset (FGSM) 25.00% 27.80%
unknown Adv. dataset (PGD) 17.16% 17.36%
unknown Adv. dataset (JSMA) 34.04% 34.96%
b) Defending Unknown Attacks: Experimental results are
present in this part to prove our fine-tuned svhnNet model
is useful for defending unknown attacks. Because this is
unknown attack, we set another DNN classifier, different from
svhnNet, as the targeted model, which is not known by our
LAD method. All experiments settings were the same as
those in the last part, defending attacks targeted on svhnNet.
Table VI shows the classification accuracy under unknown
attacks. On unknown adversarial dataset generated by FGSM,
PGD and JSMA, FT-2.0 svhnNet improves the accuracy from
25.00%, 17.16%, and 34.04% to 27.80%, 17.36% and 34.96%,
respectively. This manifests that our fine-tuned svhnNet model
can robustly defend against FGSM, PGD, and JSMA unknown
attacks.
c) Robustness of Adversarially Trained Classifier: In this
part, classification results on clean SVHN test dataset by
different fine-tuned svhnNet are shown. We fine-tuned the
svhnNet on adversarial datasets generated by FGSM, PGD,
and JSMA that was targeted on svhnNet. In addition, svhnNet
was also adversarially trained on our generated adversarial
dataset. All the fine-tuned svhnNet were used to classify the
clean SVHN test dataset. Table VII presents the classification
accuracy in details. We could find fine-tuned svhnNet on our
adversarial dataset under  = 0.05 gets the best performance.
Even the bad result of our model is still better than other
methods’. This indicates the fine-tuned model by our method
is more robust.
TABLE VII
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY ON SVHN TEST DATASET USING ORIGINAL
AND FINE-TUNED SVHNNET MODELS USING DIFFERENT ADVERSARIAL
EXAMPLES. THE FT-number SVHNNET IS OUR FINE-TUNED MODEL ON
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES WITH DIFFERENT .
Trained models Classification accuracy
Original svhnNet 93.85%
Fine-tuned svhnNet on JSMA 93.27%
Fine-tuned svhnNet on PGD 91.49%
Fine-tuned svhnNet on FGSM 91.32%
FT-0.05 svhnNet on our model 94.83%
FT-0.15 svhnNet on our model 94.80%
FT-0.5 svhnNet on our model 94.58%
3) Experiments on CelebA: We also conducted experi-
ments on CelebA dataset and the results are claimed in this
section. Our task is the classification of smile or non-smile
for an input image. The training dataset is part of CelebA,
including 19999 images. The test dataset consists of 2000
images randomly chose from the whole dataset. Because the
size of original images in CelebA is 178×218, we firstly pre-
TABLE VIII
DEFENDING ATTACKS TARGETED ON CELEBANET: CLASSIFICATION
ACCURACY ON Adv. dataset BY ORIGINAL CELEBANET AND FT-0.1
CELEBANET ON Adv. dataset (our model  = 2.0).
Datasets original CelebANet FT-0.1 CelebANet
Adv. dataset (FGSM) 52.75% 50.90%
Adv. dataset (PGD) 12.25% 11.75%
Adv. dataset (our model  = 2.0) 81.05% 84.20%
process the images to 128×128 using DLIB [32]. We detect
faces in images and crop them into square size. The classifier
for this classification task is based on VGG net [30]. We
fixed the convolution and pooling layers of VGG11 as the
feature extractor and add more fully connected layers to reduce
dimensions and get labels. We called this model as CelebANet
(See Appendix Table XIV for details) and the model trained on
the clean CelebA training dataset is called original CelebANet.
In addition, the architecture of boundary-guided generator for
CelebA is shown in Appendix Table XV.
a) Defending Attacks Targeted on CelebANet: On
CelebA dataset, we also conducted experiment, defending
attacks targeted on CelebANet from FGSM and PGD, to
prove our model’s effectiveness. For both attack methods,
2000 benign images in test dataset are used to generate 2000
adversarial examples, with the perturbation  = 0.3. These
adversarial examples constitute Adv. dataset (FGSM) and Adv.
dataset (PGD). Analogously, we used our model to generate
adversarial examples with perturbations [0.1, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0], to
form Adv. dataset (our model). In this experiment, attack
methods have full access to CelebANet. We classified the
adversarial dataset by original CelebANet and fine-tuned
CelebANet. As shown in Table VIII, the FT-0.1 CelebANet
improves classification accuracy on Adv. dataset (our model
 = 2.0) from 81.05% to 84.30%. FT-0.1 CelebANet is the
fine-tuned model on our adversarial examples with  = 0.1).
As for the slightly dropped accuracy on Adv. dataset (FGSM
and PGD), the two factors that generating better adversarial
examples on CelebA is harder and the attack methods know
all the details of CelebANet model, make the defence by
adversarial training more difficult.
b) Defending Unknown Attacks: Experiments are carried
out to defend attacks targeted on other DNN models (called
black CelebACNN) and the results are present in this part.
This black CelebACNN can only access the training dataset
of pre-processed CelebA images. We used FGSM and PGD
as attack methods to attack black CelebACNN. Likewise, we
randomly selected 2000 legitimate examples to form CelebA
test dataset to generate 2000 adversarial examples by the two
attack methods, which formed unknown Adv. dataset (FGSM)
and unknown Adv. dataset (PGD). The generated adversarial
dataset was classified by the original CelebANet and the fine-
tuned CelebANet. Results are reported in Table IX, where
the FT-0.1 CelebANet is our fine-tuned model on adversarial
examples with  = 0.1. We can see that the FT-0.1 Cele-
bANet is able to defend this kind of attacks, with improving
the classification accuracy on unknown adversarial dataset of
FGSM and PGD from 52.65% to 52.8%, and from 13.90% to
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TABLE IX
DEFENDING UNKNOWN ATTACKS: CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY ON black
Adv. dataset BY ORIGINAL CELEBANET AND FT-0.1 CELEBANET.
Datasets original CelebANet FT-0.1 CelebANet
unknown Adv. data (FGSM) 52.65% 52.8%
unknown Adv. data (PGD) 13.90% 32.55%
32.55%, respectively. This manifests that our fine-tuned model
can robustly defend against these attacks.
c) Robustness of Adversarially Trained Classifier: In
order to verify our model’s ability to improve adversarial
robustness of classifier, we compared the classification per-
formance of different fine-tuned CelebANet on clean CelebA
test datasets. We fine-tuned CelebANet on different adversarial
datasets generated by different attack methods and our model.
After that, we used these fine-tuned classifiers to classify the
CelebA test dataset. From Table X, it is obvious that our
model acquires the best result, and especially improves 8.45%
compared with the original CelebANet which is trained on
clean CelebA training dataset. This proves that our fine-tuned
model is more robust than others.
TABLE X
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY ON CELEBA (SMILE AND NON-SMILE) TEST
DATASET USING DIFFERENT FINE-TUNED CELEBANET MODELS ON
DIFFERENT ADVERSARIAL DATASETS.
Trained models Classification accuracy
Original CelebANet 91.40%
Fine-tuned CelebANet on FGSM 91.20%
Fine-tuned CelebANet on PGD 92.35%
Fine-tuned CelebANet on our model( = 0.1) 99.85%
Overall, our fine-tuned model is robust against different
types of attacks, even the attacks targeted on other unknown
classifiers. The proposed LAD method is able to improve
adversarial robustness of the classifier without sacrifice the
classification performance. Therefore, our LAD model is very
useful for training classifiers to improve its robustness against
various kinds of attacks in sharing model scenarios, before the
shared model is released.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel method Latent Adversarial
Defence (LAD), which is based on decision boundary in
latent space for generating adversarial examples and defending
adversarial attacks. Our model can be used to generate high-
quality and diverse adversarial examples and those examples
are also effective to attack a DNN model. After adversarial
training on our generated adversarial examples, the fine-tuned
targeted DNN model is effective against different types of
attacks, even the attacks targeted on other unknown classifiers.
In model sharing scenarios, our LAD is able to improve
adversarial robustness of shared classifiers before they are
deployed as a public service. Later, we will extend our
proposed model to generate adversarial examples based on
multi-class decision boundary and on larger size image dataset,
especially the generator to generate better quality examples
on these larger natural images dataset, such as ImageNet. We
will also try to give the theoretical guarantee to improve the
adversarial robustness of classifiers.
APPENDIX
TABLE XI
ARCHITECTURE OF BOUNDARY-GUIDED GENERATOR FOR MNIST. Linear
INDICATES LINEAR TRANSFORMATION; Conv Transpose DENOTES
TRANSPOSED CONVOLUTION; AND Conv REPRESENTS CONVOLUTION.
Layers Layer parameters
Linear input: 500, output: 50 × 4 × 4
Conv Transpose kernel: 2 × 2, stride: 4 × 4
Conv kernel: 3 × 3, stride: 1 × 1
Conv Transpose kernel: 2 × 2, stride: 3 × 3
Conv kernel: 4 × 4, stride: 1 × 1
Conv kernel: 5 × 5, stride: 1 × 1
TABLE XII
THE ARCHITECTURE OF SVHNANET. Conv MEANS CONVOLUTION LAYER;
Linear INDICATES LINEAR TRANSFORMATION; kernels MEANS NUMBER OF
KERNELS; kernel MEANS THE DIMENSION OF KERNEL; stride MEANS THE
STEPS OF CONVOLUTIONS.
Layers Layer Parameters
Conv & Maxpool 64 kernels, kernel:3 x 3, stride: 1 x 1
Conv & Maxpool 128 kernels, kernel:3 x 3, stride: 1 x 1
Conv & Maxpool 256 kernels, kernel:3 x 3, stride: 1 x 1
Conv & Maxpool 512 kernels, kernel:3 x 3, stride: 1 x 1
Conv 512 kernels, kernel:3 x 3, stride: 1 x 1
Linear & ReLU input: 512 × 4 × 4, output: 4096
Dropout dropout rate: 0.5
Linear & ReLU input: 4096, output: 2048
Linear & ReLU input: 2048, output: 512
Linear input: 512, output: 10
TABLE XIII
ARCHITECTURE OF BOUNDARY-GUIDED GENERATOR FOR SVHN. Linear
INDICATES LINEAR TRANSFORMATION; Conv Transpose DENOTES
TRANSPOSED CONVOLUTION; AND Conv REPRESENTS CONVOLUTION; BN
REPRESENTS BATCH NORMALIZATION; kernels MEANS NUMBER OF
KERNELS; kernel MEANS THE DIMENSION OF KERNEL; stride MEANS THE
STEPS OF CONVOLUTIONS.
Layers Layer parameters
Linear input: 4096, output: 512 × 2 × 2
Conv & BN & ReLU kernels: 512, kernel: 3 × 3, stride: 1
Conv Transpose & BN kernels: 512, kernel: 2 × 2, stride: 1
Conv & BN & ReLU kernels: 512, kernel: 3 × 3, stride: 1
Conv Transpose & BN kernels: 512, kernel: 2 × 2, stride: 1
Conv & BN & ReLU kernels: 256, kernel: 3 × 3, stride: 1
Conv Transpose & BN kernels: 256, kernel: 2 × 2, stride: 1
Conv & BN & ReLU kernels: 128, kernel: 3 × 3, stride: 1
Conv Transpose & BN kernels: 128, kernel: 2 × 2, stride: 1
Conv & BN & ReLU kernels: 64, kernel: 3 × 3, stride: 1
Conv & Tanh kernels: 3, kernel: 1 × 1, stride: 1
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TABLE XIV
THE ARCHITECTURE OF CELEBANET FOR CLASSIFYING CELEBA
DATASET. Linear INDICATES LINEAR TRANSFORMATION; FEATURE
EXTRACTOR IS THE PART OF CLASSIFIER USED FOR EXTRACTING
FEATURES TO CONSTRUCT BOUNDARY.
Layers Layer Parameters
Feature Extractor All Conv and Pooling Layers of VGG11
Linear input: 512 × 4 × 4, output: 4096
ReLU & Dropout dropout rate: 0.5
Linear input: 4096, output: 2048
ReLU & Dropout dropout rate: 0.5
Linear input: 2048, output: 1
TABLE XV
ARCHITECTURE OF BOUNDARY-GUIDED GENERATOR FOR CELEBA. Linear
INDICATES LINEAR TRANSFORMATION; Conv Transpose DENOTES
TRANSPOSED CONVOLUTION; AND Conv REPRESENTS CONVOLUTION; BN
REPRESENTS BATCH NORMALIZATION. kernels MEANS NUMBER OF
KERNELS. kernel MEANS THE DIMENSION OF KERNEL. stride MEANS THE
STEPS OF CONVOLUTIONS.
Layers Layer parameters Repeat
Linear input: 4096, output: 512 × 4 × 4 1
Conv Transpose & BN kernels: 512, kernel: 2, stride: 1 1
Conv & BN & ReLU kernels: 512, kernel: 3, stride: 1 3
Conv Transpose & BN kernels: 512, kernel: 2, stride: 1 1
Conv & BN & ReLU kernels: 512, kernel: 3, stride: 1 3
Conv Transpose & BN kernels: 256, kernel: 2, stride: 1 1
Conv & BN & ReLU kernels: 256, kernel: 3, stride: 1 3
Conv Transpose & BN kernels: 128, kernel: 2, stride: 1 1
Conv & BN & ReLU kernels: 128, kernel: 3, stride: 1 2
Conv Transpose & BN kernels: 64, kernel: 2, stride: 1 1
Conv & BN & ReLU kernels: 64, kernel: 3, stride: 1 2
Conv & Tanh kernels: 3, kernel: 1, stride: 1 1
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